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I have taken on the task of commenting briefly
upon the tax avoidance problem under the United
States income taxes.
Let me begin by defining the problem. I conceive
of it as centering on the question of what is to be
done about efforts of taxpayers to minimize their
taxes by arranging their affairs in more or less abnor­
mal or forced ways so as to comply literally with
statutory provisions that confer certain tax advan­
tages. Please note that I have narrowed the topic
somewhat. Excluded from it are attempts to stretch
or distort accounting judgments or classifications in
computing taxable income. Also left out are efforts
to defraud the government by willfully and knowingly
making out a false return, or by manufacturing untrue
evidentiary documents, or by doing the numerous
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things that are commonly regarded as tax crimes.
My subject concerns the gentle and sophisticated tax
dodger who hopes to succeed by taking advantage
of the law rather than by disobeying it. Fcrtunately,
I am not called upon to locate a precise line of de­
marcation between tax avoidance and tax fraud or
evasion.
Our campaign against the tax dodger has been
anchored mainly in the judiciary and legislature.
While the Treasury has attempted to combat avoid­
ance in the promulgation of regulations, this activity
has been of secondary importance, except where the
statute confers special power on the administrators in
avoidance situations. Some commentators have sug­
gested that the most logical way to deal with the
whole tax dodger problem would be to invest the
Treasury with broad substantive power to refine the
statutory rules in response to taxpayer ingenuity.
There is, however, virtually no support for undertak­
ing so far reaching a reform in our tax system. On
the contrary, the impartiality of the Treasury is still
widely questioned.
The courts generally have been in the forefront in
dealing with the avoidance problem. From the judi­
cial perspective, the central question can be restated
as this: Under what circumstances is formal compli­
ance with the explicit terms of the statute enough
to attain a tax advantage which it purports to confer?
Obviously this is basically a matter of statutory inter­
pretation. But it is one of peculiarly vital importance
for our tax structure. If the courts were to hold the
view that form always must prevail (unless the legis­
lature has specified otherwise), tax dodging would
be too easy, the public would soon become disturbed,
and the voluntary compliance foundation of our sys­
tem would be weakened. If the courts were to take
the extreme opposite view that form need never pre­
vail (unless explicitly provided by statute), tax law
would become too uncertain, and the resulting chaos
would materially impede business and financial opera­
tions. Our courts understandably have chosen a mid­
dle ground: form must sometimes prevail but not
always. And thus we face the basic judicial problem
of under what circumstances is it to prevail?
In reading the innumerable decisions in which this
question was at issue, one is not likely to find many
comfortable answers. In part the difficulty lies in the
rhetoric of saying that a taxpayer is free to arrange
his affairs so as to minimize taxes, and that a tax sav­
ings motive is immaterial in applying the statutory
rules (unless the statute states otherwise). This kind
of talk by courts solves nothing. The intent to mini­
mize taxes cannot control the question whether fcrm
should prevail because almost all rationally planned
business transactions do take taxes into account; and
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it should be equally plain that if such an intent were
not present, there would be no tax dodger problem.
Another part of the difficulty is that decisions often
seem to be by invective alone. It appears that the
taxpayer loses because something he has done is said
to be a "sham" or "artifice," or "device" or even worse.
Such a finding might be a sound basis for decision
where the taxpayer has represented that he has done
something - such as organized a corporation - when
in fact he has done nothing of the kind. In the cases
we are dealing with, however, the taxpayer in fact
has followed the form he has selected, even though
he chose it only because of tax considerations. To
call one of these transactions a sham is merely a way
of stating the conclusion that the form is not control­
ling, without telling us why adherence to form in the
particular case was not acceptable. It probably is
also a way of revealing the emotional reaction of the
court to the taxpayer's cunning.
A similar trouble is encountered in decisions which
go against the taxpayer on the precept that the tax
result is to be governed by what was actually done
rather than by some declared purpose, or that the
transaction under scrutiny is not in fact what it ap­
pears to be in form. These are both ways of stating
that in the particular case substance is to govern over
form, but in themselves they fail to teach us why
these cases differ from the many situations in which
form does control.
Equally unenlightening are most of the decisions
which rest merely on a purported discovery of a more
or less particularized legislative intention. Almost
always the actual controversy arises because the leg­
islature has not provided a sufficient guide on the
point and the court is called upon to repair the omis­
sion. Although judicial deference to legislative inten­
tion is statesmanlike, it need not obscure the fact that
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will suffice. If only a modicum of such purpose is
enough, the skilled tax practitioner perhaps can be
counted on to arrange for its presence. But if a very
substantial dose is demanded, the requirement might
defeat many transactions which the business commu­
nity regards as normal. From the Treasury's view­
point, however, the uncertainty might be other than
an evil. Taxpayers are forced to operate without a
roadmap for successful tax dodging, and the resulting
doubts about the terrain clearly have the effect of
reducing the magnitude of the problem by discour­
aging experimentation with novel transactions.
These characteristics of the judicial approach to
coping with tax dodging bring us to the legislative
efforts. In the main they have followed three patterns.
One has been to specifically qualify certain rules
with a hroad directive regarding the consequences
of a tax savings motive or an absence of business
purpose. Legislative directions of this nature have
been given a variety of expressions. The taxpayer is
to lose if tax avoidance is found to be a principal
purpose, or he is to lose only if it is found to be the
principal purpose, or only if it is found to be a major
purpose; and furthermore, the words with which the
burden of proof is placed on the taxpayer have dif­
fered in their forcefulness. All such directives, how­
ever, have one thing in common. Regardless of their
particular phrasing, they embody a kind of circularity.
Improper tax minimization is enjoined by requiring
a showing that tax avoidance was not high on the
list of motivations. But since the transaction, if it
passes muster, does result in a tax advantage, and
since we can't expect the rational taxpayer to be
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blind to this fact, the courts ultimately are required
to distinguish between acceptahle tax minimization
and unacceptable tax avoidance. It is only a slight
overstatement to say that these legislative directives
inveigh against tax dodging by instructing the courts
to strike down instances in which tax avoidance
loomed large, without defining what tax avoidance is.
The courts thus must determine when minimization
constitutes avoidance, and when such avoidance is so
large a component of the motivation as to run afoul
of the statutory directive. It can be seen that a legis­
lative business purpose rule operates essentially not
unlike its judicial counterpart.
An important exception deserves mention. A stat­
utory directive-and particularly one that explicitly
puts discretionary power in the hands of the Treasury
-is apt to cause taxpayers to seek prior administrative
clearance of transactions which conceivably could run
afoul of the anti-avoidance doctrine. POSSibly the
most significant consequence of the statutory direc­
tives is to place enormous leverage in the Treasury
through its power to rule or refuse to rule on pro­
posed transactions. The wisdom of this result has not
gone unchallenged.
A second legislative pattern has been the enact­
ment of specific rules to meet new tax avoidance sit­
uations as they are discovered. This approach, for
example, has typified our handling of the capital gain
versus the ordinary income question presented by
bonds issued at a discount and bonds purchased with
coupons detached. Its efficacy depends in large part
on the willingness of the legislature to backstop the
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statute year after year with a considerable mass of
more or less trivia. Even with a completely cooper­
ative legislature, however, the approach cannot avoid
the vexatious problem of the innovator. Should the
early bird be allowed the advantage which is being
denied to others, so that speed and daring in tax
avoidance is rewarded; or should the legislation be
made retroactive to cover everybody; or should some
compromise position be taken? Generally we have
shied away from giving our so-called loophole clos­
ing measures an effect prior to their date of enact­
ment or introduction into the legislature, probably
in the thought that retroactivity is unsportsmanlike
and may even be unconstitutional. But we frequently
have accompanied them with an expression of com­
mittee intention that no inference about the prior law
is to be drawn from the statutory charge, thus offer­
ing the courts a free hand to make the law for the
earlier period. Occasionally we have tried to move
in the opposite direction by statements to the effect
that the new statutory language is intended only to
be declaratory of what is thought to be the existing
law. While this procedure may be persuasive with
the courts, it cannot serve to bind them. _
A third legislative pattern has consisted of dealing
more or less comprehensively with a given area of
tax law by trying to anticipate the situations which
might arise and prescribing specifically on which side
of the tax line they fall. The collapsible corporation
provisions of our statute are illustrative of this tech­
nique. Such highly detailed provisions answer many
particular questions which actually arise or might
otherwise come up-but at a very real price. Obvi­
ously they add considerably to the bulk of the law.
It is also evident that the legislature can neither an­
ticipate all the line-testing questions which might
arise nor safeguard completely against ambiguity in
the many words employed in disposing of the ques­
tions covered. Inherent in this technique, moreover,
is what some regard as the unfortuante quality of
providing tax minimizers with an excellent blueprint
of avoidance plans which apparently have received
legislative blessing. Specificity and clarity, in brief,
make the use of tax savings techniques a lot easier
and the code a lot longer.
To this juncture I have considered tax dodging
from the standpoint of combating it; I shift now to
the perspective of the tax practitioner. While as an
informed citizen he might well feel that the artful
tax dodge should be checkmated-although I hope
he will take care that the cure is not worse than the
irritation-as a practitioner he should avoid con­
fusing ethics and common sense. Since it is the
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indeterminacy of the legal rules that is at the heart
of the tax avoidance problem, I see no moral or
ethical inhibitions against trying out new and doubt­
ful schemes. Practitioners need feel no guilt in send­
ing up trial balloons. But I am convinced that
frequently such experimentation represents poor
judgment and sometimes verges on being foolish. I
mean only that all things considered, including an
assessment of the chances of success and the costs
of losing, the taxpayer's interests would be better
served by taking an alternative path. All too often,
from the taxpayer's vantage-point, the real vice of
being a tax-minimization pioneer is not that the plan
ultimately fails to gain the tax advantage scught, but
that in choosing the dodge, the taxpayer foregoes
other tax opportunities or business or estate planning
openings which are unquestionably available to him.
Permit me to add, parenthetically, that I couple
the freedom of practitioners to experiment with a
broad license in the administrators to shoot at the
trial balloons. Furthermore, it may be that our sys­
tem is deficient in not penalizing unsuccessful experi­
ments more heavily than now in view of the costs
which they impose on the whole legal apparatus.
There is one respect in which the pursuit of tax
minimization does or should raise an ethical question
for practitioners. All too often the willingness to take
the gamble rests not alone on the cleverness of the
plan but in part on the thought that the facts as
stated in the tax return and accompanying documents
will not Hag the arrangement for the administrators.
Thus it is hoped that the plan may succeed because
it is passed over without a test on the merits. Even
if such incomplete disclosure does not violate legal
standards, I submit that it comes precariously close
to being unsporting conduct and to trenching on the
high ethical standards to which professional men
assert they aspire.
It would produce a misleading emphasis to end on
this moralistic note. Instead I prefer to remind you
of what ultimately lies at the base of the tax avoidance
problem. Tax dodging arises in acute form only be­
cause our tax statute, in defining taxable income,
makes distinctions which depart from a comprehensive
measurement of a taxpayer's actual economic en­
hancement. Thus our tax law distinguishes between
a dollar of ordinary income and a dollar of capital
gain, a dollar of realized income and a dollar of un­
realized income, and so forth. All of us feel and
usually act on the feeling that, in maximizing our
income or our economic enhancement, a dollar is a
dollar. When the tax law distinguishes between dol­
lars, it must do so in terms which are unrelated to
the real economic position of the taxpayer and which,
in this sense, are arbitrary. The essence of the tax
avoidance problem is found here: where the basic
distinction drawn by the law is itself arbitrary, no
satisfactory general principle is available for deciding
when taxpayers should be defeated in their attempts
to move themselves across to the favorable side of
that arbitrary line.
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